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Using cross-country regressions, we examine the relationship between “point-source” 
resource abundance and economic growth, quality of institutions, investment in human 
and physical capital, and social welfare (life expectancy and infant mortality). Contrary to 
most literature, we find little evidence of natural resource curse outside of the economies 
in transition. In the economies in transition, there is some evidence that natural resource 
wealth is associated with higher infant mortality. This negative effect, however, exists 
only relative to other resource rich countries. Compared to other economies in transition, 
natural resource abundant transitional economies are not worse off with respect to our 
indicators. 
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The Natural Resource Curse and Economic Transition 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, a large literature has developed to investigate the 
relationship between natural resource wealth of a country, its economic well being and 
political structure. Until recently, most of this literature had argued that while the 
dispersed natural resources such as fertile agricultural land were generally beneficial to 
the economy, the so-called “point-source” resources such as oil, natural gas, and some 
minerals,
1 often reduced long-run economic growth and the quality of the country’s 
government and institutions, at least in developing countries. This somewhat 
counterintuitive effect of natural resource abundance has been called the natural resource 
curse or the oil curse. The more recent literature, however, has questioned the existence 
of this curse, pointing out serious technical problems with the empirical work that claims 
to demonstrate its existence.
2  
One intuitive reason to doubt the existence of the resource curse, particularly the 
detrimental effect of natural resources on most countries’ institutions, is the apparent 
persistence of institutional quality. That is, in most countries, the quality of institutions 
changes only slowly and should not be radically affected by relatively recent discoveries 
(or recently emerged importance) of natural “point-source” resources such as oil. This 
argument, however, does not apply to the economies in transition where institutions have 
experienced radical changes in the last twenty years. One might expect, therefore, that if 
the curse of natural resources does exist, it would be particularly pronounced in these 
                                                 
1 The term “point-source” resources was introduced by Isham et al. (2003). 
2 For a recent survey of the literature on the natural resource curse, see Rosser (2006). The most recent 
papers on the topic include Alexeev and Conrad (2009), Brunnschweiler (2008), and Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte (2008).   4
economies. The goal of this paper is to examine the impact of natural resource 
endowment, and especially oil wealth, on economic growth and its factors, institutional 
development, and certain aspects of welfare in the economies in transition. While our 
overall methodology follows, with some modifications, the cross-sectional approach in 
Alexeev and Conrad (2009) the present paper makes two important contributions. First, it 
evaluates the effect of point-source resources on the economies in transition and second, 
it applies the analysis to a greater range of indicators and uses more recent and larger 
dataset than did Alexeev and Conrad (2009).  
With respect to all countries, we find that the overall effect of natural resource 
wealth is either positive or negligible on all but one of the indicators we study.
3 The lone 
exception is a voice and accountability measure that is negatively and significantly 
correlated with natural resources. There is some evidence, however, that natural resource 
wealth has a negative impact on the economies in transition relative to similarly endowed 
non-transitional economies, but this evidence is fairly weak. Our results are contrary to 
those of Kronenberg (2004) who claims to show that there is a “strong negative 
correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth” and of Esanov et 
al. (2001) although the latter paper’s emphasis on the progress of structural reforms is 
different from ours.
4 Brunnschweiler (2009) also does not find any deleterious effect of 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, cross-country estimation makes it difficult to determine causality. Therefore, we would 
normally refer to correlations rather than causal “effect.” Note, however, that natural resource endowments 
and output of a country are largely exogenous and we control for many other relevant factors such as 
country’s GDP and cultural and historical legacies proxied by major religions and continental dummies. 
These considerations suggest that even cross-country regressions are likely to reflect the strength of a 
causal relationship between natural resources and economic and institutional measures that we use. 
4 Kronenberg’s results are suspect, however, because his regressions include only the economies in 
transition and, therefore, his conclusions are based on 19 observations. Moreover, Kronenberg uses the 
share of primary goods in total exports as a measure of natural resource abundance. This measure is highly 
problematic because a country whose economy functions poorly for any reason would have little to export 
but natural resources. Therefore, share of primary goods in exports may be negatively related to economic   5
oil on economic growth in transitional economies. In fact, using a panel of 27 economies 
in transition, she finds a rather strong positive link between oil wealth and growth.
5  
Our paper differs from all of the above papers at least in three important respects. 
First, rather than limiting our sample to the economies in transition, we perform our 
estimation based on a large cross-section of countries, using dummy variables (both by 
themselves and in interaction with natural resource wealth) for the economies in 
transition. Second, we estimate the relationship between natural resources and not only 
economic growth, but also with the countries’ institutions, investments in physical and 
human capital, and such indicators of welfare as life expectancy and infant mortality. 
Third, by estimating our cross-sectional regressions separately for two different years, we 
do not restrict our regression coefficients to remain the same over the period of transition. 
In addition, we employ a greater variety of measures of natural resource wealth than any 
of the above papers.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our estimation 
approach and the data. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes. 
2. Estimation approach and the data 
Our basic approach to determine the impact of natural resource wealth on the 
economies in transition is fairly straightforward. We estimate the following regression 
based on cross-sectional data: 
                                                                                                                                                 
growth for reasons unrelated to do with natural resource endowment. See Stijns (2006) for a discussion of 
natural resource endowment measures and their implications for testing for the natural resource curse. 
5 While panel analysis has certain advantages, it also creates potential estimation problems that are difficult 
to resolve. Fixed effects estimation is difficult to use because of relatively little variation over time in many 
relevant variables. Random effects, on the other hand, require rather strong assumption that the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the included regressors. Both methods usually assume that 
there are no structural changes (beyond possibly those that can be reflected in a time fixed effect) in the 
estimated relationship over the period of estimation. This last assumption may be particularly problematic 
for an economy in transition. In addition, if growth rates are autocorrelated, the resulting panel estimates 
would be biased unless appropriated adjustments are made.   6
  Yi = b0 + b1GDPi + bXi + b2TRi +b3CISi + b4Ni + b5TRi·Ni + ei   (1) 
where i is a country index (it is dropped in the discussion below), Y is an indicator of the 
country’s development, the impact on which of natural resources we are trying to 
establish, GDP is per capita GDP in purchasing power parity terms, TR is a dummy 
variable that equals unity if the economy is in transition from socialism to markets, CIS is 
a dummy variable for the countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, N is an indicator of natural resource endowment, and X is a vector of other 
controls. (The list of the economies in transition and the CIS countries, including the oil 
producers, is provided in corresponding dummy variable descriptions in Table 1.) 
We estimate regression (1) for several different dependent variables and for two 
different years, 1996 (or either 1995 or 2000, depending on data availability) and 2005. 
The choice of 1996 is dictated by the fact that this is the first year for which World Bank 
institutional quality indicators are available. Regressions with school enrollment as 
dependent variables use year 2000 instead of 1996 because of relatively poor data 
availability for years prior to 2000. (The two different base years for the regressions are 
also notable in that the 1995-2000 period was preceded by several years of relatively low 
oil prices while oil prices were high and increasing during 2000-2005 period.) Our 
dependent variables include growth of per capita GDP between 1996 and 2005, 
institutional quality indicators (rule of law, corruption control, and voice and 
accountability)
6, factors of economic growth (measures of investment in physical capital 
and human capital) and demographic welfare indicators (life expectancy, infant 
mortality). A more detailed description of these and other measures we use as well as our 
sources for these data are provided in Table 1.  
                                                 
6 The precise meaning of these indicators is described in Kaufmann, et al. (2008).   7
All of our regressions are estimated for two different measures of point-source 
resource abundance. One measure is the logarithm of one plus per capita value of oil 
output in the country. The value of oil output is calculated by multiplying the number of 
barrels of oil produced by the world price of oil in 2007 US dollars. No adjustment is 
made for oil quality or cost of extraction. The other measure is the logarithm of one plus 
the amount of non-renewable energy and mineral resources extracted by the country as a 
percentage of gross national income (GNI). While the first measure is much narrower 
than the second one, it has two significant advantages. First, it focuses on the ultimate 
“point-source” resource (oil) and second, it is independent of the country’s level of 
economic development. This latter property is particularly important. Measures of natural 
resource abundance expressed as shares of GDP (or GNI) may produce biased results, 
because countries that have low GDP for reasons unrelated to their natural resource 
endowment would also have large natural resource-to-GDP ratios. Therefore, it might 
seem that the low GDP and other problems related to low GDP are the result of large 
natural resource wealth while in reality it is the low GDP that causes natural resource 
wealth to appear to be high. (Although our resource measures are based on output, we 
sometimes refer to resource wealth or abundance, because stock and flow measures are 
highly correlated in the case of oil and mineral resources. For example, proven oil 
reserves and annual oil output had a coefficient of correlation of about 0.75 in 2008.) 
One of our most important control variables is per capita GDP in purchasing 
power parity terms. While this variable is likely to have an important impact on most of 
the dependent variables that we study, its use also creates significant estimation 
difficulties. First, most of our dependent variables are likely to influence per capita GDP,   8
causing simultaneity problems. Some authors attempt to alleviate this problem by using 
earlier year GDP data (e.g., using 1970 GDP in year 2000 cross-country regressions). 
This approach does not solve the simultaneity problem, however, because GDP data for 
different years are highly correlated. In addition, the use of much earlier GDP data as 
controls in our regressions is problematic, because the pre-1989 GDP data for most 
economies in transition are quite unreliable. For our purposes, perhaps even a more 
important problem with using per capita GDP as a control variable is that it is correlated 
with natural resource endowment. That is, countries rich in oil and other natural resources 
tend to have higher GDP per capita. Because of this, regressions where dependent 
variables are positively correlated with GDP (e.g., institutional quality regressions) may 
produce estimates biased in favor of the natural resource curse. As Alexeev and Conrad 
(2009) explained, “[a]ccording to their GDP, natural resource rich countries should have 
good institutions. Because their institutions are poor relative to industrialized countries 
with similar GDP levels (i.e., they are at the level where they would have been if the 
country had no oil) the regression assigns a negative coefficient to the measure of oil 
wealth.” In reality, however, such outcomes imply that high GDP that resulted mostly 
from oil wealth simply does not improve institutional quality rather than makes it worse, 
as suggested by the oil curse literature.  
In order to solve or at least alleviate we instrument GDP via these geographical 
variables. Valid (excluded) instruments for per capita GDP should be important 
exogenous determinants of per capita GDP and should not affect the dependent variable, 
except via per capita GDP. It is this latter requirement that makes finding good 
instruments a difficult task in our case. We use overidentification tests to select valid   9
instruments among the basic set of geographic variables (country’s latitude, European 
population dummy, Latin American dummy, and South East Asia dummy) used for a 
similar purpose by Alexeev and Conrad (2009). We recognize that this is a somewhat 
formalistic approach, but it is better than not instrumenting per capita GDP at all.  
In the conventional instrumental variables approach, per capita GDP is regressed 
in the first stage on both the excluded instruments and the other independent variables 
(included instruments). Then, the value of per capita GDP predicted in the first stage 
regression is used in the second stage. The overall effect of an independent variable such 
as natural resource abundance measure on the dependent variable would then combine its 
first-stage effect on per capita GDP and its second stage coefficient. For example, if the 
first stage coefficient of variable X is ", the second stage coefficient of X is β, and the 
second stage coefficient of per capita GDP is (, then the point estimate of the combined 
effect of X on the dependent variable would be π = "(+β. It is important to keep in mind 
this point when interpreting the results below. In particular, it will be useful to remember 
that for the economy in transition dummy variable the first stage coefficient, ", is 
negative and for natural resource wealth ">0.  
We are interested in estimating the overall effect, π, of natural resources on our 
dependent variables. A disadvantage of combining point estimates of the coefficients 
from two stages of instrumental regressions is that we do not obtain a standard error of 
this estimate. For this reason, we prefer to use a two-step procedure, according to which 
we first calculate predicted value of per capita GDP using the excluded instruments and 
those included instruments whose overall effect on our dependent variables is not the   10
focus of our paper. In the second step, we use this predicted value of per capita GDP as 
one of the regressors together with all our included instruments. 
For example, in our growth rates regressions, we first determine the predicted 
values of the logarithm of per capita GDP for 1996 from the following regression: 
^
Y 1996=7.7+1.1⋅LAT+1.4⋅EUR+1.1⋅LATAM+.9⋅EAST−1.1⋅ETHN+.01⋅PRTS+.01⋅MSLM      (2) 
(.4)    (.75)       (.31)         (.22)             (.43)  (.41)      (.00)          (.00)    
       A d j u s t e d   R
2 =0.45 
       Observations  =153 
where LAT stands for absolute latitude of the country, and EUR, LATAM, and EAST are 
dummy variables for the European population, Latin and Central America, and South 
East Asia, ETHN denotes the index of ethnolinguistic decentralization, and PRTS and 
MSLM are shares of Protestants and Muslims in the country, respectively. Then, we 
regress per capita GDP growth rates for 1996-2005 on 
^
Y 1996, and our other independent 
variables, including TR, CIS, N, and an interaction term TR⋅N, but excluding LAT, EUR, 
LATAM, and EAST. Of particular interest in this second regression are estimates of the 
coefficients of the variables related to economic transition and to natural resources.  
Due to the use of a generated regressor, standard errors produced by OLS are 
biased (see Pagan, 1984) and adjusting for this bias is quite difficult. For this reason we 
base our inferences on bootsrapped standard errors.
7   
We select our control variables based on what has been used in the literature on 
economic growth and on institutional quality (e.g., ethnic heterogeneity and share of 
Protestants in the country’s population have been shown to correlate, respectively, 
                                                 
7 This approach extends the procedure used by Alexeev and Conrad (2009) by adding regressors at the first 
stage and using bootstrapped errors in the second stage.    11
positively and negatively with the degree of corruption in a country; see, Treisman, 
2000). After using a number of different specifications, we settled on the variables that 
are truly exogenous with respect to our dependent variables and that are statistically 
significant in most of our regressions. For example, we use the share of Protestants and of 
Muslims, but not the share of Catholics, because the latter variable was usually not 
statistically significant. We stress also, that no control variables that we tried had a 
significant effect on the estimates that we focus on in this paper. 
As long as we use per capita GDP predicted from (2) and similar regressions for 
other years, our OLS regressions are not likely to suffer from simultaneity problems.
8  
3. Results 
In this section we present the results of our regressions and discuss briefly their 
implications. We present both the conventional 2SLS regressions and the corresponding 
OLS regressions with predicted per capita GDP as one of the regressors. In addition, we 
present a few OLS regressions with actual per capita GDP as a regressor in order to 
illustrate the potential for misleading results when this specification is used. 
3.1.  Economic growth regressions 
We begin by estimating regression (1) with growth rate of GDP as a dependent 
variable. Specifically, we use the logarithm of growth of per capita purchasing power 
parity GDP between 1996 and 2005 (i.e., logarithm of the ratio of per capita GDP in 2005 
and in 1996). The only explanatory variables that are consistently statistically significant 
in either the second stage of instrumental variable regressions or OLS regressions are the 
                                                 
8 Measures of oil and minerals output might be somewhat endogenous to economic growth and the quality 
of  institutions, but this endogeneity is most likely rather weak, except when per capita GDP is in the 
denominator. However, in this latter case, the endogeneity would act to increase the negative effect of 
natural resources on economic performance and institutional quality. Since we do not observe such 
negative effect in most of our regressions, this potential endogeneity only makes our results stronger.   12
transition economy dummy variable and the CIS dummy variable. Both of these have 
positive coefficients in all regressions. Neither per capita oil output nor the share of 
energy and mineral rents in GDP are statistically significant in any of the regressions 
either by themselves or in interaction with the transition dummies. That is, natural 
resource wealth does not appear to have affected economic growth in countries around 
the world between 1996 and 2005. The institutional quality variables are not statistically 
significant either. Note that we use actual rather than predicted values of per capita 1996 
GDP as one of the controls in OLS regressions. This is because the use of predicted 
values does not change qualitative results of these regressions. We also note that using 
predicted values of corruption control in OLS regressions in a manner similar to the use 
of predicted value of per capita GDP does not affect the results. The instruments in the 
instrumental variable estimation appear to be strong and easily pass the overidentification 
tests.  Table 3 presents the results with only the coefficients of the variables of greatest 
interest shown. These results are contrary to Kronenberg’s (2004) but are consistent with 
Brunnschweiler (2009). 
3.2. Institutional quality regressions 
While relatively recent growth rates in the economies in transition and elsewhere 
do not seem to be affected by natural resource wealth, there is a possibility that longer 
term economic development could be affected by the curse, because the abundance of 
point-source resources might be detrimental to the country’s institutions that would in 
turn have a negative effect of growth rates in the future. This argument might be 
particularly important in the economies in transition, because their institutions have been 
experiencing dramatic changes during the transition period.    13
To examine whether institutional quality is correlated with natural resource 
abundance, we run regressions (1) with three different measures of institutional quality 
(rule of law, control of corruption, and voice and accountability) as dependent variables 
for 1996 and for 2005. As explained before, the fact that per capita GDP levels are likely 
to be affected by both the institutional quality and natural resources makes the use of per 
capita GDP as a control variable problematic. Instead, we employ values of this variable 
predicted from regressions (2). However, for the sake of comparison, we also present 
some of the regressions where actual values of per capita GDP are used. The results are 
shown in Tables 5 and 6. The instrumental variables regressions that produce very similar 
point estimates of our coefficients of interest (via combining the first and second stage 
coefficients, π = "(+β, as described in Section 2 above) for these and other regressions 
are available upon request.  
The contrast between OLS regression estimates with actual and predicted values 
of per capita GDP underlines the importance of the use of the latter variable. When actual 
GDP is used, natural resources have a highly statistically significant negative coefficient 
while in the rule of law and corruption control regressions with predicted per capita GDP 
the coefficient is usually positive and in one case even significant at 10% level. In the 
voice and accountability regression, however, the coefficient of natural resource variable 
remains negative and statistically significant even with predicted per capita GDP values. 
(We present the results with the actual per capita GDP variable only for the rule of law 
regression. All other institutional quality regressions that use actual per capita GDP 
follow the same pattern.)   14
More important for the purposes of the present paper is that the coefficient of the 
interaction between natural resource abundance and transition economy dummy while 
often negative is not statistically significant in any of the institutional quality regressions 
that use predicted value of per capita GDP as an independent variable. This result does 
not support the notion of a more or less significant natural resource curse with respect to 
institutional development either in general or in the economies in transition. 
Note that the dummy variable for the economies in transition is negative and 
highly statistically significant in these regressions. This is not particularly surprising, of 
course, because institutions in these economies are still developing. The CIS dummy 
variable is negative, but not statistically significant, suggesting that controlling for other 
factors, the CIS members do not have worse institutions than the other economies in 
transition. 
3.3. Physical and human capital regressions 
Next we examine the relationship between natural resource endowment and the 
non-institutional factors determining economic growth: investment in physical and 
human capital. Most regressions (1) with gross capital formation as a dependent variable 
do not produce statistically significant coefficients for any of our variables of interest and 
we do not present them here.
9 Human capital regressions produce somewhat more 
interesting results. We use net primary and secondary school enrollment rates in years 
2000 and 2005 (the World Bank’s WDI Online database has more or less comprehensive 
school enrollment data only starting in 1999). As Tables 7-8 show, natural resource 
measures generally have positive and significant (both statistically and numerically) 
                                                 
9 The only exceptions are the positive and highly significant coefficient of the transition economy dummy 
variable in the 2005 regressions and a marginally significant positive coefficient of natural resource 
measure in one of the 1996 regressions.   15
effect on primary and secondary school enrollments,
10 but there is evidence that this 
effect is weaker or even absent in the economies in transition. This is implied by the fact 
that in all specifications, the coefficients of the interaction between natural resources and 
the transition dummy are negative and most are sufficiently close by absolute value to the 
coefficients of non-interacted natural resource measure, so that the combined point 
estimate of the effect of natural resources on human capital investment for the economies 
in transition is about zero. Interestingly, the CIS countries have statistically significantly 
greater enrollments in secondary schools both in the 2000 and 2005 regressions and in 
primary schools in the 2000 regressions. 
3.4. Social welfare regressions 
Finally, we run regressions (1) with dependent variables representing two 
different social welfare indicators: life expectancy and infant mortality for under five 
years of age. The results are presented in Tables 9-10. Unlike in the human capital 
accumulation regressions, economic transition (but not natural resources) appears to be 
associated with worse demographic outcomes, albeit rather weakly. The coefficients of 
the economic transition dummy variable are always negative for life expectancy and 
positive for infant mortality, although they are not always statistically significant in the 
life expectancy regressions.
11 The relatively low life expectancy in some of the 
economies in transition has been addressed in several studies (e.g., Cornia and Paniccià, 
2000, and Brainerd, 1998) but no consensus with respect to its causes seems to have 
emerged.  
                                                 
10 Note that our results with respect to the effect of natural resource abundance on investment and on 
human capital in the non-transition economies are contrary to those obtained by Gylfason (2001) and 
Gylfason and Zoega (2002). The difference is due to our use of predicted values of per capita GDP. 
11 We use 1995 instead of 1996 in these regressions, because WDI Online has the data for a significantly 
greater number of countries in 1995 than in 1996.   16
The coefficients of the natural resource measures on the other hand are always 
positive for life expectancy and negative for infant mortality although they are not 
statistically significant in the 2005 regressions. The interaction terms between economic 
transition and natural resources have opposite signs and are close by absolute value to the 
corresponding coefficients of natural resource measures, implying that for the economies 
in transition, natural resource abundance might not have the beneficial effect that it has in 
other economies, but there is no implication of a detrimental effect relative to other 
economies in transition.  
4. Conclusions  
Using cross-sectional regression approach, we examine the relationship between 
“point-source” resource abundance and economic growth, quality of institutions, 
investment in human and physical capital, and such measures of social welfare as life 
expectancy and infant mortality. Contrary to much of the existing literature, we find no 
significant evidence of natural resource curse outside of the economies in transition with 
respect to all but one measure we investigate. The only exception is a negative correlation 
between oil and natural resources in general and the voice and accountability measure. In 
the economies in transition, natural resource abundance seems to have had some 
detrimental effect on infant mortality. However, the negative effect of natural resources 
in this case is barely statistically significant and appears simply to offset the positive 
effect of natural resources in other resource rich countries, implying that the net effect of 
natural resource endowments on this indicator in the economies in transition is 
insignificant.   17
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Data description and sources  
 
Variable  Description and Source 
CIS  A dummy variable that equals unity if the country is a former Soviet 
republic that is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and 
has a value of zero otherwise. Countries of the CIS: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, 




The “control over corruption” index for the respective year (the year is 
either indicated explicitly or corresponds to the year in table/column 
heading). The index is intended to measure “perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and 
private interests.” Higher values indicate lower corruption. Source: 
Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
Economy in  
transition 
A dummy variable that equals unity if the country is an economy in 
transition from socialism to markets, and is zero otherwise. Economies in 
transition: Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, 
Hungary, Cambodia, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Mongolia, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia/Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Vietnam as well 




An index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization computed as one minus the 
Herfindahl index of ethnic group shares. The definition of ethnicity here 
involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. Source: 
Alesina et al. (2003) 
European  
population 
A dummy variable that has a value of one for countries with predominantly 
European population, and zero otherwise. 
Growth of GDP  Logarithm of the ratio of per capita GDP in purchasing power parity terms 
for years 2005 and 1996. Source: WDI Online (2008). 
Infant mortality 
rate 
Logarithm of the number of children dying before the age of 5 per 1000 
births. Source: WDI Online (2008). 
Life expectancy at 
birth 




Share of Muslim population in the country. Source: La Porta, et al. (1999). 
Per capita GDP 
(actual) 
Logarithm of per capita PPP GDP for the respective year (the year is either 
indicated explicitly or corresponds to the year in table/column heading) in 
constant 2005 international dollars. Source: WDI Online (2008). 
Per capita GDP 
(predicted) 
Values predicted from regressions (2) and (3), Section 2 of the present 
paper. 
Per capita oil 
output 
Logarithm of one plus the value (at world market price in 2007 US$) of 
country’s per capita oil output for the respective year (the year is either 
indicated explicitly or corresponds to the year in table/column heading). Oil 
output and world market price are from BP Statistical Review (2008) 
available at http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview   20
Primary school 
enrollment 
The number of children enrolled in primary school that belong to the age 
group that officially corresponds to primary schooling, expressed as a 




Share of Protestant population in the country. Source: La Porta, et al. 
(1999). The number for Lithuania is from Iwaskiw (1995). 
Quality of 
regulations 
The “regulatory quality” index for the respective year (the year is either 
indicated explicitly or corresponds to the year in table/column heading). The 
index is intended to measure “perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development.” Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
Resource 
depletion/GNI 
Logarithm of one plus depletion of the country’s energy and mineral 
resources as a share of gross national income for the respective year (the 
year is either indicated explicitly or corresponds to the year in table/column 
heading). Source: WDI Online (2008). 
Rule of Law  The “rule of law” index for the respective year (the year is either indicated 
explicitly or corresponds to the year in table/column heading). The index is 
intended to measure “perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
Secondary school 
enrollment 
The number of children enrolled in secondary school that belong to the age 
group that officially corresponds to secondary schooling, expressed as a 




The “voice and accountability” index for the respective year (the year is 
either indicated explicitly or corresponds to the year in table/column 
heading). The index is intended to measure “perceptions of the extent to 
which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media.” Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest 
 
Variable Entire  sample  Economies in 
transition  CIS 
  Obs. Mean  STD  Obs. Mean STD  Obs. Mean STD 
Corruption  Control,  1996  139 .032  1.01  28  -.378 .641  12  -.915 .365 
Corruption  Control,  2005  154 -.044  1.02  27  -.379 .635  11  -.855 .193 
Growth of GDP  153  .241  .260  28  .479  .186  11  .552  .196 
Infant mortality rate, 1995  148  73.6  71.0  27  40.6  32.3  11  53.9  30.6 
Infant mortality rate, 2005  153  59.2  66.3  27  26.3  23.4  11  37.5  23.6 
Life expectancy at birth, 
1995 
154 65.3  10.5  27  68.5 3.75 12  66.9 2.38 
Life expectancy at birth, 
2005 
154 67.3  11.3  28  70.4 4.36 12  67.9 2.66 
Log of Per capita GDP, 
1996 
156 9238  11064 28  5603 4460 11  2793 2031 
Log of Per capita GDP, 
2005 
159 12030 14095 29  8679 6144 11  4933 3417 
Per capita oil output, 1996  154  373.9  1503  28  48.5  107.5 12  103.7  148.7
Per capita oil output, 2005                   
Primary school 
enrollment, 2000 
117 83.1  17.9  18  90.8 4.81 6  87.4 5.13 
Primary school 
enrollment, 2005 
119 88.0  13.0  22  90.8 4.39 9  88.5 5.26 
Resource depletion/GNI, 
1996 
150 5.17  10.3  27  5.57 9.77 11  10.5 13.8 
Resource depletion/GNI, 
2005 
145 9.66  18.5  27  11.0 20.8 11  22.2 29.2 
Rule of Law, 1996  150  .054  .999  27  -.332  .580  11  -.794  .313 
Rule of Law, 2005  154  -.068  .999  27  -.340  .647  11  -.85  .245 
Secondary school 
enrollment, 2000 
109 60.5  27.5  20  75.7 17.1 7  78.0 8.46 
Secondary school 
enrollment, 2005 
98  66.3  26.6  19  81.6 14.8 9  82.4 4.30 
Voice and accountability, 
1996 
153 -.026  .954  27  -.233 .796  11  -.768 .429 
Voice and accountability, 
2005 
154 -.078  .965  27  -.206 1.00  11  -.955 .510 
 
Note: Descriptive statistics are for the maximum number of countries that were used in 
the regressions   22
Table 3. GDP growth regressions (IV GMM specifications)  
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of the ratio of per capita purchasing power parity GDP 



























Variable  name  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Per capita GDP, 1996  -  .014 
(.028)  -  -.039 
(.044)  -  .021 
(.024)  -  .025 
(.037) 
Corruption control, 
1996  - - -  .074 
(.048)  - - -  .013 
(.047) 



















































(.019)  - - -  - 
Resource 

















Centered R-squared  .670  .192 .644 .360 .695 .226 .660  .409 
F-statistic for excl. 
instruments (p-value) 
25.97 
(.000)  -  49.24 
(.000)  -  36.42 
(.000)  -  42.77 
(.000)  - 
Hansen J (p-value)  -  .600  -  .180  -  .625  -  .172 




Robust standard errors are in parentheses;  
 
Constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 
Excluded instruments: LAT, EUR, LATAM, EAST 
 
1
st  stage regressions for per capita GDP in the specification with corruption control are 
very similar to the 1
st  stage regressions in Column 1 and 5, respectively, although they 
are not identical due to the different number of observations in these regressions. 
 
   23
Table 4. GDP growth regressions (OLS)  
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of the ratio of per capita purchasing power parity GDP 
for 2005 and 1996 
Variable name  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 










Corruption control, 1996  -  .016 
(.025)  -  .034* 
(.020) 
















Per capita oil output, 1996  .007 
(.012) 
-.002 
(.006)  - - 





(.019)  - - 
Resource depletion/GDP, 









Adjusted R-squared  .162  .320  .196  .399 




Bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications  are in parentheses;  
 
Constant term and some of the control variable coefficients (the share of Muslims and of 
Protestants in the population, and the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization) are not 
shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level.   24
 
 
Table 5. Institutional quality regressions with per capita oil output value, 1996 and 2005 
(OLS)  
 
Dependent variables: Measures of institutional quality for 1996 and 2005 
 1996  2005 














  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Per capita GDP, 












Per capita GDP, 
actual 
.550*** 































































R-squared  .766  .577  .587 .567 .595  .607 .576 




Robust standard errors (bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications in OLS 
regressions with predicted per capita GDP) are in parentheses;  
 
Constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variables 
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Table 6. Institutional quality regressions with share of resource depletion in GNI, 1996 
and 2005 (OLS) 
 
Dependent variables: Measures of institutional quality for 1996 and 2005 
 1996  2005 














  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) 
Per capita GDP, 












Per capita GDP, 
actual 
.571*** 
(.048)  - -  -  - -  - 





























































R-squared  .776 .588 .603  .588  .648 .661  .602 




Robust standard errors (bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications in OLS 
regressions with predicted per capita GDP) are in parentheses; 
 
Constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variables 
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Table 7. Human capital investment regressions with per capita oil output value, 2000 and 
2005 (OLS)  
 
Dependent variables: Logarithm of primary school enrollment, % net; logarithm of 
secondary school enrollment, % net, 2000 and 2005 
 2000  2005 












  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Per capita GDP, 
predicted  -  .265*** 






Per capita GDP, actual  .124*** 
(.026)  -  .421*** 
(.048)  - - - 


















































R-squared  .542  .476 .762  .530 .356 .463 




Robust standard errors (bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications in OLS 
regressions with predicted per capita GDP) are in parentheses;  
 
Constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variables  27
 
Table 8. Human capital investment regressions with share of resource depletion in GNI, , 
2000 and 2005 (OLS) 
 
Dependent variables: Logarithm of primary school enrollment, % net; logarithm of 
secondary school enrollment, % net, 2000 and 2005 
 2000    2005 












  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Per capita GDP, predicted  -  .233*** 






Per capita GDP, actual  .123*** 
(.024)  -  .416*** 
(.048)  - - - 


















































R-squared  .576 .501 .768 .501 .395 .532 




Robust standard errors (bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications in OLS 
regressions with predicted per capita GDP) are in parentheses;  
 
Constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variables  28
Table 9. Life expectancy and infant mortality regressions with per capita oil output value, 
1995 and 2005 (OLS)  
 
Dependent variables: Logarithm of life expectancy at birth, total (years); logarithm of 
infant mortality rate, under-5 (per 1000 births), 1995 and 2005 
 1995 2005 












 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Per capita GDP, 
predicted  -  .136*** 






Per capita GDP, 
actual 
.108*** 
(.010)  -  -.680*** 
(.044)  - - - 


















































R-squared .762  .551  .891  .686  .594  .673 




Robust standard errors (bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications in OLS 
regressions with predicted per capita GDP) are in parentheses;  
 
Constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variable  29
Table 10. Life expectancy and infant mortality regressions with share of resource 
depletion in GNI, 1995 and 2005 (OLS)  
 
Dependent variables: Logarithm of life expectancy at birth, total (years); logarithm of 
infant mortality rate, under-5 (per 1000 births), 1995 and 2005 
 1995  2005 












  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (4) (6) 
Per capita GDP, 
predicted  -  .145*** 






Per capita GDP, actual  .110*** 
(.010)  -  -.704*** 
(.045)  - - - 


















































R-squared  .760  .533 .893  .681 .618 .729 




Robust standard errors (bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications in OLS 
regressions with predicted per capita GDP) are in parentheses;  
 
Constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variable    30
Appendix: IV GMM Regressions 
 
Table 1A. Institutional quality regressions with per capita oil output value (second stages 
of IV GMM estimation) 
 
Dependent variables: Measures of institutional quality for 1996 and 2005 
 1996  2005 
  2d stage  2d stage  2d stage  1
st stage  2d stage  2d stage  2d stage 














  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 












































































- -  -  14.37 
(.000)  - -  - 
Hansen J (p-value)  .864  .487  .944  -  .432  .304  .329 




robust standard errors are in parentheses;  
 
constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 
Excluded instruments: LAT, EAST (for Rule of law and Control of corruption); LAT, EUR 
(for Voice and accountability); 
 
1
st  stage regressions for 1996 are not shown here because they are very similar to 1
st 
stage regressions for per capita GDP (column (1) in Table  3), although they are not 
identical due to the different number of observations in the regressions; 1
st stage 
regressions for 2005 are the same for all institutional variables; 
 
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variables   31
 
Table 2A. Institutional quality regressions with share of resource depletion in GNI, 1996 
and 2005 (IV GMM estimation)  
 
Dependent variables: Measures of institutional quality for 1996 and 2005 
 1996  2005 
  2d stage  2d stage  2d stage  1
st stage  2d stage  2d stage  2d stage 














  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 








































































R-squared  .789 .741  .720  .707 .832 .820  .695 
F-statistic for  
excl. instruments 
(p-value) 
- -  -  18.65 
(.000)  - -  - 
Hansen J (p-value)  .785  .435  .923  -  .633  .492  .398 




robust standard errors are in parentheses;  
 
constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 
Excluded instruments: LAT, EAST (for Rule of law and Control of corruption); LAT, EUR 
(for Voice and accountability); 
 
1
st  stage regressions for 1996 are not shown here because they are very similar to 1
st 
stage regressions for per capita GDP (column (5) in Table 3), although they are not 
identical due to the different number of observations in the regressions; 1
st stage 
regressions for 2005 are the same for all institutional variables; 
 
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variables   32
Table 3A. Human capital investment regressions with per capita oil output value, 2000 
and 2005 (IV GMM specifications)  
 
Dependent variables: Logarithm of primary school enrollment, % net; logarithm of 
secondary school enrollment, % net, 2000 and 2005 
 2000  2005 
 1
st stage   2d stage  2d stage 2d  stage 2d  stage 










  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















































R-squared  .682  .405 .784 .356 .770 
F-statistic for excl. instruments (p-
value) 
14.14 
(.000)  - - - - 
Hansen J (p-value)  -  .406  .546  .310  .156 




robust standard errors (bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications in OLS 
regressions with predicted per capita GDP) are in parentheses;  
 
constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 
Excluded instruments: LAT, LATAM; 
 
1
st  stage regressions for the two human capital investment measures  in 2000 are very 
similar, although they are not identical due to the different number of observations in the 
regressions. Column (1) shows 1
st stage regression for primary school enrollment. 1
st  
stage regressions for 2005 are not shown here because they are very similar to those in 
Column (4) of Table 2A, although they are not identical due to the different number of 
observations in the regressions; 
 
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variables   33
 
Table 4A. Human capital investment regressions with share of resource depletion in GNI, 
2000 and 2005 (IV GMM) 
 
Dependent variables: Logarithm of primary school enrollment, % net; logarithm of 
secondary school enrollment, % net, 2000 and 2005 
 2000  2005 
 1
st stage   2d stage  2d stage  2d stage  2d stage 










 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 


















































R-squared .711  .511  .788  .440  .779 
F-statistic for excl. instruments (p-
value) 
15.74 
(.000)  - - - - 
Hansen J (p-value)  -  .481  .495  .769  .166 




robust standard errors (bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications in OLS 
regressions with predicted per capita GDP) are in parentheses;  
 
constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 
Excluded instruments: LAT, LATAM; 
 
1
st  stage regressions for the two human capital investment measures are very similar, 
although they are not identical due to the different number of observations in the 
regressions. Column (1) shows 1
st stage regression for primary school enrollment. 1
st  
stage regressions for 2005 are not shown here because they are very similar to those in 
Column (4) of Table 2A, although they are not identical due to the different number of 
observations in the regressions; 
 
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variables   34
 
Table 5A. Life expectancy and infant mortality regressions with per capita oil output 
value, 1995 and 2005 (IV GMM)  
 
Dependent variables: Logarithm of life expectancy at birth, total (years); logarithm of 
infant mortality rate, under-5 (per 1000 births), 1995 and 2005 
 1995  2005 
 1
st stage   2d stage  2d stage  2d stage  2d stage 










  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















































R-squared  .662 .773 .884 .664 .814 
F-statistic for excl. instruments 
(p-value) 
41.48 
(.000)  - - - - 
Hansen  J  (p-value)  -  .082 .565 .946 .818 




robust standard errors (bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications in OLS 
regressions with predicted per capita GDP) are in parentheses; 
 
constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 




st  stage regressions for the two 1995 specifications are very similar, although not 
identical due to the different number of observations in the regressions. Column (1) 
shows 1
st stage regression for life expectancy. 1
st  stage regressions for 2005 are not 
shown here because they are very similar to those in Column (4) of Table 2A, although 
they are not identical due to the different number of observations in the regressions; 
 
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variables 
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Table 6A. Life expectancy and infant mortality regressions with share of resource 
depletion in GNI, 1995 and 2005 (IV GMM)  
 
Dependent variables: Logarithm of life expectancy at birth, total (years); logarithm of 
infant mortality rate, under-5 (per 1000 births), 1995 and 2005 
 1995  2005 
 1
st stage   2d stage  2d stage  2d stage  2d stage 










  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


















































R-squared  .679 .775 .893 .695 .856 
F-statistic for excl. instruments 
(p-value) 
58.27 
(.000)  - - - - 
Hansen J (p-value)  -  .106  .677  .765  .114 




robust standard errors (bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications in OLS 
regressions with predicted per capita GDP) are in parentheses;  
 
constant term and some of the independent variables coefficients (LAT, EUR, LATAM, 
EAST, MSLM, PRTS) are not shown; 
 
*** - significant at 1% level; ** - significant at 5% level; * - significant at 10% level; 
 




st  stage regressions for the two specifications are very similar, although not identical 
due to the different number of observations in the regressions. Column (1) shows 1
st stage 
regression for life expectancy. 1
st  stage regressions for 2005 are not shown here because 
they are very similar to those in Column (4) of Table 2A, although they are not identical 
due to the different number of observations in the regressions; 
  
Independent variables are measured for the same years as dependent variables 
 